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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 701: OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY
WITNESSES
Federal Rule of Evidence 701 states:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness'
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness and (b)helpful to a clear understanding
of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. I
Rule 701 governs the admissibility of opinions or inferences of a
lay witness who is not testifying as an expert. 2 However, the
admissibility of such lay opinion testimony depends on satisfying
two requirements. First, the opinion or inference must be
"rationally based on perceptions of the witness." 3 Second, "the lay
opinion testimony must be 'helpful' to the trier of fact in
understanding the testimony of the witness or in determining a fact
in issue."4 Thus, "lay opinions are not 'helpful' under the Rule
whenever the jury can readily draw the necessary inferences and
conclusions without the aid of the opinion." 5 This is illustrated in
1. FED. R. EVID. 70 1.
2. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 663 1, at

228 (1992).
3. FED. R. EVID 701(a).
4.

GLENN

WEISSENBERGER,

WEISSENBERGER'S

FEDERAL

EVIDENCF

§ 701.4, at 340 (2d ed. 1995). Furthermore, the advisory committee's note states
in pertinent part:
[N]ecessity as a standard for permitting opinions and conclusions has
proved too elusive and too unadaptable to particular situations for
purposes of satisfactory judicial administration.... If,despite these
considerations, attempts are made to introduce meaningless assertions
which amount to little more than choosing up sides, exclusion for lack
of helpfulness is called for by the rule.
FED. R EvID. 701 advisory committee's note (citation omitted).
5. GLENN

WVEISSENBERGER,

WVEISSENBERGER'S

FEDERAL

EVIDENCE

§ 701.4, at 341. See, e.g., United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1992).
The Rea court stated:
[W]hen a witness has fully described what a defendant was in a position
to observe, what the defendant was told, and what the defendant said or
did, the witness's opinion as to the defendant's kmowledge will often not
be "helpful" within the meaning of Rule 701 because the jury will be in
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United States v. Dicker,6 where the Third Circuit distinguished
between the admissibility of a witness' interpretation of "code
words" and clear statements. The court stated that "interpretation
of code words by a witness is permissible," where the testimony
relates to the meaning of words which would not be readily
comprehended by the average person. 7 The court explained that in
the case of clear statements, such interpretation is not permitted as
is "barred by the helpfulness requirement of both Fed. R. Evid. 701
and Fed. R. Evid. 702."8
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey.9 the United States Supreme

Court held that "Rule 701 permits even a lay witness to testify in
the form of opinions or inferences drawn from her observations
when testimony in that form will be helpful to the trier of fact." 10
In United States v. Rivera,1 the Second Circuit recently interpreted
as good a position as the witness to draw the inference as to whether or
not the defendant knew.
Id. at 1216.
6. 853 F.2d 1103 (3rd Cir. 1988).
7. Id. at 1109,
8. Id.
9. 488 U.S. 153 (1988). In Beech Aircraft, plaintiffs' spouses, a Navy
flight instructor and a student, were killed when, during training exercises, their
Navy aircraft crashed. Id. at 156. Plaintiffs allege that the crash was caused by
"some defect in the aircraft's fuel control system," whereas defendants asserted
pilot error as the cause. Id. at 156-57. The cause of the accident could not be
determined with certainty because of the extensive damage and lack of
survivors. Id. at 157. Therefore, both sides relied primarily on "expert
testimony" to prove their case. Id. For the defendants, this expert testimony took
the form of a "JAG Report" which contained findings of fact, opinions, and
recommendations. Id. Plaintiffs objected to the use of such a report, asserting
that it was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) as lacking
trustworthiness. Id. at 169. However, the Supreme Court allowed such testimony
in as trustworthy, holding that such testimony was permissible under "the
general approach of relaxing traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony"
pursuant to Rules 701 through 705, since it would be helpful to the trier of fact
in determining the cause of the accident. Id.
10. Id. at 169.
I I. 22 F.3d 430 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, the court found that the testimony of
a lay witness against a co-conspirator as to the operations of an organization
designed to distribute heroin was admissible under Rule 701. Id. at 434. Even
though the witness "did not create all of the records that were introduced, her
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Rule 701 in stating the requirements for a lay witness to testilf% as
to opinions. The court noted that Rule 701 applies to lay witness
testimony where the witness had firsthand knowledge or observed
the event 12 and that "[t]he trial court's decision to admit lay
testimony will be overturned only if it constitutes an abuse of
discretion." 13 Moreover, in United States v. Rea, 14 the court
determined that:
[t]here are a number of objective factual bases from which it is
possible to infer with some confidence that a person knows a
given fact. These include what the person was told directly, what
he was in a position to see or hear, what statements he himself
made to others, conduct in which he engaged, and what his
background and experience were. 15
Generally, under Rule 701, a lay witness may testify in the form
of an inference or opinion:
(1) when an expression of the witness' personal knowledge could
be conveyed in no other form, (2) when a witness formed an
accurate total impression, although unable to account for all the
details upon which it was based, or (3) most importantly, when
an accounting of the details alone would not accurately convey
16
the total impression received by the witness.
testimony showed that she had first-hand knowledge of the organization's
record-keeping methods," thereby satisfying the first requirement of the rule and
fulfilled the second requirement by being "helpful to the jury's understanding of

the operations of the organization." Idat 434-35.
12. Id. at 434. See, e.g., United States v. Urlacher, 979 F.2d 935 (2d Cir.
1992). The court upheld the admission of opinion testimony of a lay witness in
order to help the jury understand the "confusing and disjointed discussions" on
tape recordings of conversations between the defendant and the lay witness, in
light of the fact that the lay witness had firsthand knowledge of the
conversations. Id. at 939.
13. River, 22 F.3d at 434.
14. 958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that testimony of a lay

witness concerning whether the defendant knew that he was participating in a
tax evasion scheme was inadmissible on the ground that it was not helpful to the
jury).
15. Id. at 1216.
16. See GRAHAM, supranote 2, § 6631, at 232-33 (citations omitted).
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Specifically, the topics on which lay witnesses have been
permitted to express an opinion include "[t]he appearance of
persons or things, identity, the manner of conduct, competency of a
person, feeling, degrees of light or darkness, sound, size, weight,
distance and an endless number of things that cannot be described
factually in words apart from inferences." 17 Furthermore,
"[a]bsolute certainty on the part of the lay witness is not
18
required."
In New York, as a general principle, lay persons may testify to
facts, but are not permitted to testify as to their own opinions,
inferences, or conclusions because it is believed that such
inferences arising from the facts should be left to the purview of
the jury. 19 However, lay persons are permitted to give opinion
evidence "only when the subject matter of the testimony was such
that it would be impossible to accurately describe the facts without
stating an opinion or impression."'20 Under present law,
"[c]onfusion has resulted because this restrictive standard involves
not only the difficult task of differentiating between fact and

17. Id. at 235 (quoting Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 417
(1952)); see, e.g., United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding that the trial court correctly admitted opinion testimony by a lay
witness that a white powder was in fact cocaine and stated "[a]lthough a drug
user may not qualify as an expert, he or she may be competent, based on past
experience and personal knowledge and observation, to express an opinion as a
lay witness that a particular substance perceived was cocaine or some other
drug.").
18. See GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 663 1, at 232.
19. See People v. Russell, 165 A.D.2d 327, 332, 567 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (2d
Dep't 1991), affd, 79 N.Y.2d 1024, 594 N.E.2d 922, 584 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1992).
The trial court held that "under the proper circumstances, a lay witness, even
though not an eyewitness to the crime, may be allowed to express his or her
opinion that the individual depicted in a photograph is the defendant." Id. at
336, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
20. Kravitz v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Ctr., 113 A.D.2d 577,
581-82, 497 N.Y.S.2d 51, 55 (2d Dep't 1985) (holding that lay opinion
testimony by a doctor, not a psychiatrist, indicating whether his patient was a
truthful person was inadmissible because there was no issue as to the plaintiffs
veracity).
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opinion, but also between opinions which are necessary and those
1
which are not."2
The Second Department recognized this change in People i.
Russell.22 In Russell, the court stated that "lay opinion testimony
may be admissible when the subject matter of the testimony is such
that it would be impossible to accurately describe the facts without
stating an opinion or impression." 23 Furthermore, the court
explained that in reaching its determination about whether to admit
such lay opinion testimony, a court "may consider a variety of
factors, including whether the lay opinion testimony would be of
assistance to the jury ... and whether a sufficient foundation has
been established to show that the opinion is rationally based upon
the perception of the witness.. . .,24 Thus, "[a]n ordinary witness
may express his opinion whenever the facts involved are such that
merely describing them is not sufficient to enable ajudge or jury to
form proper conclusions about them." 2 5

21. THE NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A CODE OF
EVIDENCE FORTHE STATE OFNEW YORK, § 701, at 160, Comment (1991). New

York's Proposed Code of Evidence, an attempt to codify New York evidence
law, would allow a lay individual to provide testimony in the form of opinion or
inference only where such testimony is "rationally based on the perception of
the witness, and helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness
or the determination of a fact in issue." Id. at 159.
22. 165 A.D.2d at 327, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
23. Id at 335, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 553. The court held that non-eyewitness
testimony concerning the identification of the defendant, an alleged bank
robber, through photographs taken by the bank's security camera was
admissible testimony since "all the essential preconditions for the admission of
the opinion evidence were satisfied." Id. at 336, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
24. Id. at 336, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 553-54. Moreover, the court stated that the
trial court "may also wish to instruct the jurors at the time the evidence is
introduced that the opinion is merely an aid to their decision based upon all the
facts and circumstances of the case and that they are entitled to either accept or
reject it."Id.at 336, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
25. GARY SHAW, CANUDO ON EVIDENCE LAWs OF NEW YORK 192 (1995).

See, e.g., Matter of Sanchez, 141 Misc. 2d 1066, 1067, 535 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938
(Far. Ct. Bronx County 1988) (stating that "[lhay witnesses have been
permitted to give expert opinions on areas of general knowledge such as the
emotional state of people being observed.").
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In conclusion, the difference between the admissibility of
opinion testimony by lay witnesses in New York and under the
Federal Rules of Evidence focuses on whether the testimony is
necessary or simply helpful in the case at hand. In New York, lay
witnesses are restricted to testifying to a report of facts and can
only testify as to opinion when, from the nature of the subject
matter, more specific evidence cannot be obtained. 2 6 Rule 701 has
no such requirement. Opinion testimony by a lay witness is
admissible under Rule 701, which simply requires that it must be
rationally based on that witness' perceptions and must help the jury
to clearly understand the testimony. 2 7 However, it should be noted
that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, lay opinion testimony,
otherwise admissible under Rule 701, may be prohibited by the
trial court "if the probative value of the testimony is sufficiently
outweighed by the considerations set forth in Rule 403."28

26.
27.
28.
F.2d at

See Russell, 165 A.D.2d at 335, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
FED. R. EVID. 701.
See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 4. § 701.4, at 341. see also Re,, 958
1216, where the court stated:
[E]ven those lay opinions that pass Rule 701's dual test of
admissibility may be excluded by the court under Fed. R.
Evid. 403 if the court determines that the admission of the
opinion will be cumulative or a waste of time, or that its
helpfulness is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice to the party opposing admission of the evidence.
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